MICHAEL BROWN, FEMA, NEW ORLEANS, THE NEWS MEDIA, & HURRICANE KATRINA

Although FEMA does not oversee evacuation and sheltering, we may feel the effects of local decisions pretty soon. The current population at the Superdome in New Orleans is 25,000.

---FEMA message from David Passey sent before landfall to other senior officials on August 28.

The local government and the state government are responsible for what happens in their cities prior to a hurricane whether it be evacuation or shelters . . . all disasters start locally.

The governor said she should have called out the Guard sooner, and the mayor said the only thing he would do differently is yell louder.

---Representative Shays referring to Louisiana Governor Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Nagin.

Response operations are being conducted over a disaster area of nearly 90,000 square miles . . . We ask for patience from individuals who may be uncomfortable but are safe while we conduct search and rescue efforts for those who are stranded and without commodities.

With any major disaster and especially one resulting from terrorists, the federal government will probably refer to the basic steps of prevent, protect, respond, and recover. Over the years, the federal government has basically defined response as the immediate reaction to an event of severe human and environmental threats during and after the event. Recovery has come to indicate restoration of the community after an event such as a terrorist attack, biological or chemical episode, soil or water contamination, and using federal resources to deal with these problems. Respond and recovery are the two phases of Hurricane Katrina that Congress and the public became concerned with, and they made the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the main focus for their post-landfall conditions. However, in natural disasters and particularly ones that are known to be imminent, there ought to be two phases familiar to everyone at the government and citizen level: preparation and response. When assigning blame and solving the numerous problems regarding Hurricane Katrina, the preparation phase especially should be considered.

The preparation phase is the most important part of any disaster plan and response. If the preparation plan is the right one, the response will be smoother. There will be less loss of life when preparation is adequate. Resources can be used quicker and relief brought to people sooner if preparation is not flawed. Because almost all of the government investigation and media speculation in the immediacy of Katrina was aimed at response, this phase is not emphasized in this paper. It is argued here that more attention should be given to preparation rather than response and that Katrina victims are not being served responsibly by making FEMA the chief agent of blame during the preparation phase.

When the United States president says that the response of the federal government was inadequate, naturally the media and congressional focus will fall upon the response of the federal agency in charge. FEMA does have a great role in the response phase when considering the aid that states need from the federal government in a catastrophic event. Part of that role is coordination and logistical planning. However, the state and city managers have the most responsibility in preparing emergency management systems and their officials for disasters. In support of these arguments, an analysis of who did not have the most culpability in the preparation phase is presented in this writing.

In addition to lesser events that were predetermined before Katrina landfall, the following fallacies and foul-ups are also addressed: FEMA Director Michael Brown bundled the Katrina response and he is at fault for the response; FEMA was slow to respond to Katrina and its victims; people staying in New Orleans were below poverty level and had no way out of the city; FEMA was at fault for not evacuating more people; FEMA should have done more to create a greater sense of urgency; too many National Guard were in Iraq; the War on Terrorism deflected emphasis from emergency management of natural disasters to terrorism; FEMA should not have been merged into the Department of Homeland Security; Louisiana Democrats attempted to divert blame for Katrina to the Republicans; and the news media pushed an erroneous agenda and distorted reality.

At that time all those decisions were being made by the city of New Orleans and I am assuming the State because it was the National Guard that was helping to bring people into the Superdome. They were actually providing the transportation and I can only assume the city was telling them where to take them. But FEMA at that point had no decision-making responsibility as to where to take these people or where to put them.

---FEMA’s Marty Bahamonde statement to the HSGA Committee regarding the Superdome conditions.

Sometimes the news media use “shame stories” to goad a government response for problems that they believe are going unsolved. When shame stories are used without much investigating into how an agency or federal plan or specific legislation works, it is highly possible that the news media will get the wrong person or form the wrong opinion. Just a week and a half after being put in total charge of the Katrina disaster, FEMA Director Michael Brown “accused the news media of making him a scapegoat and blamed local officials for the uncoordinated response.”[1] Less than two weeks after going to Louisiana, Brown was removed from his position by Chertoff. Without a doubt many thought the battle was over because of the constant news stories about FEMA, but taking the general out of the war before it is lost seems unwise. Congress would not bring Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco to its hearings because it did not want to take the leadership out of its repair and recovery mode. Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff, under much media skepticism, refused to accept Brown’s resignation for at least a month after Brown submitted it. Surely Chertoff understood that a director who had three years’ experience in that position should not be replaced in the middle of a crisis with someone new just because the news media, and Congress with its hearings unfinished, determined Brown had to go. Katrina was such a calamity, and one with larger state and local implications, that critics also should reflect on what FEMA had to work with, who FEMA had to work with, and what it actually accomplished.

In the aftermath, a few circumstances were certain. There were no roads, no civilian communication systems, and no airports. The main airport was under water for over a week. Even the ports of entry for boats were not completely functional. The National Guard had to find and designate bridges to drop off people who needed rescuing.[2] Although the military had communication capability, it had to be used for rescues in the immediacy of the flooding. It is well known from the news media that there were levee breaches on 17^th Street and London Avenue, but the news media did not report the breaches in the National Wildlife Refuge or in Plaquemines County where most of the support to the oil fields traveled through. New Orleans was flooded. The Gulf Intercoastal Waterway that stretches from Florida to Texas was not operational in some parts, especially in the inner port of New Orleans. Moving in large equipment on boats was difficult because the bridges on the canals could not be opened due to having no electricity. Although the entire state of Louisiana was declared eligible for federal assistance, at least 25 parishes (counties) were eligible for both individual and public assistance from FEMA.

New Orleans had it much worse than Mississippi in the beginning stages of rescue and recovery. Because greater resources were needed and devoured quickly in southern Louisiana, it can be assumed that all this consumption caused a dilatory effect for Mississippi victims. Additional food and water that was not prepositioned was probably routed to New Orleans first, where there clearly seemed to be a greater need. New Orleans was probably considered first for the additional military equipment needed for navigating through flood waters and for moving debris. Helicopters were direly needed in New Orleans before Gulfport, Mississippi. By August 31, the National Guard had already flown 600 people from the New Orleans Superdome to local hospitals.[3]

Had the levees not broken in Louisiana, Katrina would have done more damage to the Gulf Coast of Mississippi because the hurricane actually hit harder there. With New Orleans there was a great deal of people in a small location whereas in Mississippi there was alot of people spread over a large location. Both situations were different so both required different strategies. Altogether, Hurricane Katrina hit and damaged an area about the size of Pennsylvania. CNN described the battle zone as 90,000 square miles.[4]

By Day 3, the Department of Transportation had “provided more than 400 trucks to move 1,000 truckloads containing 5.4 million Meals Ready to Eat, 13.4 million liters of water, 10,400 tarps, 3.4 million pounds of ice, 144 generators, 20 containers of pre-positioned disaster supplies, 135,000 blankets and 11,000 cots.”[5] By September 2, just 5 days after the storm, the federal government was taking care of 91,000 victims and helping to manage 275 shelters; the FEMA-led Urban Search and Rescue had helped 4,800 people get to safe shelter; 1,200 medical personnel had been sent to hospitals in Louisiana and Mississippi; and 650 buses were coming to help relocate thousands of people from New Orleans to Houston.[6] The TSA ran Operation Air Care, which was the domestic relocation of some 22,000 people from the New Orleans airport. In the aftermath of Katrina, the US Coast Guard was credited with rescuing 33,500 persons.[7]

Some people take circumstances for granted and fail to see the benefits of the federal government that are already working for them. The federal government was working and it was accomplishing alot considering that FEMA was overwhelmed. Still, the achievements listed in the section above were not widely portrayed to the public.

Hurricane Katrina is now designated a category five hurricane. We cannot stress enough the danger this hurricane poses to Gulf Coast communities. I urge all citizens to put their own safety and the safety of their families first by moving to safe ground. Please listen carefully to instructions provided by state and local officials. ---President George Bush, August 28

Day 1 began early Monday morning on August 29, 2005, when Hurricane Katrina made landfall directly on Louisiana as a Category 4 . It was referred to as a four-state storm because it impacted Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. If one considers the refugees that Katrina left in her wake, Texas was severely impacted also. Hurricane Andrew, a Category 5, ravaged Florida in 1992. The last time a Category 5 came close to Louisiana was the 1969 storm Camille, but that hit the Mississippi Gulf Coast directly. Southern Mississippi did not have its casinos, malls, or large population back in the 1970s that it had right before Day 1 of Katrina, but the damage caused by Camille was still historical.

Emergency management for a federally declared “major disaster” falls under homeland security. In order for homeland security strategies to be successful, they must work from the bottom up. Emergency management officials are not at the bottom; the civilian population is. Civilians want the government to be a cure-all mechanism, but in times of great catastrophe, civilians are called upon to help the government thereby helping themselves. However, the federal government, via the state governments, admits at times that it cannot protect even the majority of civilians in certain locations.

There was a disaster plan in place for New Orleans pre-Katrina, and although it sounds like no plan, New Orleans was supposed to be evacuated in the event of a Category 3 storm. Eventually the National Guard evacuated 78,000 people from New Orleans who had not left before landfall.[8] The US Coast Guard was credited with rescuing 33,500 persons.[9] The National Guard, which is quite different from the Coast Guard, did 71 helicopter hoists on Day 1.[10] It will be contentious to say, but it is logical to think, that had all these people not been in New Orleans—much like the residents of Beaumont and Port Author Texas were not there during Wilma—the backlash and problems that were heaped upon FEMA would not have been nearly as monolithic.

The three types of evacuation are voluntary, recommended, and mandatory. Few people can be faulted for not leaving under voluntary and recommended evacuations, for such warnings do not sound serious or even conclusive. When a mandatory evacuation is issued, though, the government is clearly trying to protect its citizens and there should never be a question about the seriousness of this order. Representative Harold Rogers, in a House Subcommittee hearing, said New Orleans was not given the mandatory order until Sunday at 10am. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, had issued the recommended evacuation on Saturday, which was two full days before landfall. The Friday before that, about three days before landfall, Katrina was known certainly to be heading toward Louisiana as a Category 4 storm. One million people did evacuate, and Representative William Jefferson reported that 80% of New Orleans residents had gotten out. It can never be known how many more people would have left New Orleans had a mandatory evacuation order been given on Friday instead of Sunday. Nevertheless, it is most unfortunate that the mandatory order was not given until Sunday when Katrina was known the past Friday to be coming to Louisiana. The emphasis Congress is putting on when the mandatory evacuation was issued seems trifling, though, because some residents still had financial and transportation problems that precluded them from evacuating..

There can be no disputing that many of the people staying in New Orleans, after the mandatory evacuation order, were below poverty level and did not have a reliable way to leave. Not having a car, trustworthy transportation, and money for gas or hotel rooms are justifications for not heeding the evacuation order. A determination should be made on how many of these 78,000 who remained had no genuine means to evacuate. Such a determination is needed because Congress has faulted FEMA for not creating a greater sense of urgency about evacuating; because there are other cities across the country where walking and subways take the place of car ownership; and because there is something about people that makes them remain in harm’s way irregardless of the government’s order.

No good reason exists to believe that FEMA did not have a sense of urgency. Afterall, what part of mandatory evacuation, flooding, loss of electricity, major disaster, and Category 4 does not sound urgent? It was common knowledge that the levees, which kept New Orleans from becoming a contemporary Atlantis, were designed to withstand only a Category 3. If anything, it is more accurate to say that New Orleans did not appreciate the impending doom.

No matter how many times FEMA or the National Hurricane Center tells people to evacuate to avoid a catastrophic event, there will be those who choose to “ride it out” even if they had the capability to leave. News reporters constantly air testimonies of these “ride-outs.” Hurricane Wilma came to Florida less than two months after Katrina. One person stated on XM Satellite Radio before Wilma landfall “I’m not worried. Are you worried? It is only a Category 2. That is nothing.”[11] Another ride-out said on FOX, “It’s a nothing storm. Katrina was horrible, but this is a nothing storm.”[12] In another TV report that also showed people surfing, a husband and wife were heard to say “We have seven boats we need to protect. It is best we stay here.”[13] Even though a mandatory evacuation due to Hurricane Wilma had been issued on Saturday for Marco Island, it was estimated that ten percent of the people were still there on Sunday at 3pm.[14] Wilma was expected to hit Marco Island directly early Monday morning as a Category 3. Instead of imploring people to leave, CNN showed a Catholic mass being held at a church at 8am. When people are seen on television claiming they are not worried or seen surfing in the beach waters, this might dissuade others from leaving.

After landfall, all the flood waters, lack of electricity, lack of clean flowing water, and extensive infrastructure damage were well known by New Orleans residents. Still the governor and mayor had to order everyone out, and the military was given instructions to tell people to leave because New Orleans was not safe. In those same news reports though, people were shown being defiant. The military would not allow people to bring their animals to the shelters with them, so some people refused to leave their homes. One man was shown saying that all he had left was $100 and if he evacuated he did not know what he would do when that money ran out. With only $100, how could he leave for what seemed like weeks and maybe even months? So much of the New Orleans population was below the poverty level that there is no doubt many others made the same decision to ignore the evacuation orders. Furthermore, with news stories like these, absent any counterbalancing pictures or comments from previous disasters, the news media might actually be re-enforcing the hurricane complacency of people. Florida residents have acclimated to hurricanes, so there can be some understanding of why they were over-confident in Wilma. Some of these same people who chose not to leave also had a role in exacerbating the Katrina outcome. However, it is more difficult to understand why southern Louisiana residents were not more scared of riding out Katrina.

There were definitely people who did not evacuate New Orleans because they could not evacuate without local assistance. Before Katrina landfall, a plan had indeed been in place to use public transportation in New Orleans to get out those people who had no practical means to exit. This was a local or state plan that had been federally subsidized.[15] A contractor was hired to oversee it, according to Chertoff, and Mayor Nagin said the school board was in charge of the buses. Until this issue becomes more clear, it can be assumed that the contractor would have hired or selected bus drivers. With pictures of buses being under water after Katrina, those drivers and that contractor evidently did not fulfill their obligations. FEMA was faulted for not evacuating more people, but FEMA has never directly done evacuations and it certainly was not in charge of the busses. So the Senate Homeland Security Committee asked FEMA’s Acting Director David Paulison whether FEMA would evacuate people in future hurricanes. Even after the Katrina fiasco, he told Congress no because the local and state government are responsible for evacuations. Paulison said FEMA can provide money for the evacuation, but that is basically all it can do.

In times of catastrophe, America needs their politicians to be calm, even-tempered, cooperative, and fair. Hurricane victims need hope, but they do not get that when they see their leaders in despair, unable to answer questions, and begging the federal government to rescue them. Katrina victims did not need the typical party politics, but that is what they initially got.

On Day 4, Democrats were telling the national news outlets that the federal government was responding slowly because it was the poor areas of Louisiana that needed help. CNN made sure the readers of its stories knew those Democrats were black.[16] By Day 5, the national news networks were reporting widely Al Sharpton’s comments that race was a factor in the slow governmental response to Katrina victims. They were also portraying New Orleans as a lawless, chaotic area.[17] After claiming that the New Orleans levees were purposefully destroyed so that black neighborhoods would be flooded, Louis Farrakhan said federal officials should be “charged with criminal neglect” because they did nothing for five days after Katrina hit.[18]

By September 9, the Louisiana Democrats in full force were trying to divert blame for Katrina preparations onto the president. Democrat Senator Mary Landrieu called the Bush Administration incompetent, and she faulted the president for not knowing the levees were going to bust.[19] New Orleans has 13 levees stretching 300 miles. Her finger-pointing about the levees was petty and unrealistic. Senator Landrieu’s comments are more frustrating when considering the levees in her own state were not better addressed by state officials before Katrina. Excluding the 22,000 people at the Superdome, she also conveniently overlooks the fact that had the 48,000 people been evacuated before Katrina landfall—a state and local government responsibility—the repercussions of levee breaks would not have been as severe in regards to human loss.

Within the first week of Katrina, news reports were presented with Democrat accusations that too many of Louisiana’s National Guard were in Iraq. The Guard issue was the most fallacious of any of the Democrats’ diversion tactics. Lt. Colonel Milord said that of “Louisiana’s total Guard, 6,505 were in state and available to help, and 4,725 have been called up” and that the state has only “2,700 Guard members in Iraq.”[20] Lt. General Blum eventually said that there had actually been 8,500 Guard in Louisiana the day before Katrina made landfall.[21] He also said in a press conference on August 31, two days after landfall, that 75% of the nation’s Guard was still available.[22] Mississippi had 6,000 Guard available on Day 2.[23] There had been 2,500 Guard in the target zone of Mississippi pre-Katrina.[24] The military also had 1,400 military police flown into the target zone on September 1.[25] If Louisiana had 10,000 Guard—6,500 of whom were apparently ready to go on Day 1 but for whatever reason seemed not to—would the 2,700 in Iraq have made much difference? When there were thousands of guardsmen coming from other states, did the 2,700 in Iraq really matter in regards to Katrina?

There were continual numbers in the news of 2 to 3,000 national guardsmen being in Iraq instead of Louisiana for the Katrina rescue and recovery. Although there were still 300,000 Guard here in America, those same news reports never listed numbers on how many guardsmen were actually available. Having the availability numbers reported was highly significant in determining whether the Guard in Iraq had an effect on the recovery and response. Clearly this deficiency in news reporting is a problem of politics as much as it is faulty journalism. When Republicans finally did get the message across to the news media that both Louisiana and Mississippi still had 60% of its Guard immediately available, the Democrats began making arguments that the “best guardsmen” were in Iraq so the states were left with unqualified and poorly trained guardsmen.

The Guard issue eventually settled, but then cronyism took the forefront. President Bush had been coming under fire for appointing friends to various positions in the government. FEMA Director Michael Brown got his position when FEMA was absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. The résumés of the previous DHS and FEMA directors are freely available on the internet. There can be little disputing that President Bush has selected several DHS personnel, including Chertoff and Brown, who have a background that is more pedantic than practiced and seemingly more relevant to the legal field than the emergency management field. On the other hand, saying that someone is picked because of cronyism is completely different from saying the same person is unqualified for the position.

Time Magazine questioned FEMA Director Brown’s résumé. It was erroneously reported in its article that Brown had not taught at college, even though he had.[26] Because Brown refused to respond to the article before being published, there are undoubtedly more mistakes in the article. The author of the article claimed that Brown had no experience for his position. In doing that, he chose to look at Brown’s pre-FEMA background, thereby ignoring the fires in 2003 that ravaged California and the previous Florida hurricanes that FEMA handled while under Brown.

Brown was a previous FEMA deputy director and the agency’s lawyer. Now being an under secretary of DHS, Brown is essentially the highest person above the FEMA emergency responders, the National Incident Management System, the National Disaster Medical System, and the Nuclear Incident Response Team. Michael Brown was definitely the political appointee, but in consideration of unqualified personnel, which should have been the issue, the journalist overlooked all the experience of the people below him who really run FEMA.

Below Brown, each FEMA area has its own manager. FEMA is organized into several regions with a separate regional director, but Regions IV and VI are where Katrina made landfall. These two directors for these regions have had years of emergency management experience. The Director of Region IV, which is the area covering Mississippi and Louisiana, was a previous deputy director and held a management position during Hurricanes Andrew, Danny, Georges, Dennis, and Floyd. Background characteristics of some of the directors overall are an officer with the Michigan State Police for more than 26 years; director of the Emergency Management Division of the Michigan State Police; administrator for the U.S. Fire Administration; 30 years of fire and rescue services experience; certified paramedic; 41 years of government experience at the federal and state level; 3 years as the director of Arkansas Emergency Medical Services Program; and 13 years with the Arkansas Department of Health.

With FEMA, the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) will be the person chiefly running the response to a disaster. On August 28, the day before landfall, Brown named William Carwile to be FCO for Mississippi. [27] He won the 2005 Neil Frank Award for his results in hurricanes preparedness and response. Carwile, who was also in the military for 30 years, was referred to by Congressman Pickering as the most experienced FEMA worker.[28]

For Louisiana, the FCO was Bill Lokey with 30 years’ experience in emergency management. Brown named him FCO two days before the storm.[29] Phillip Parr was the senior FEMA official at the Superdome, the city-picked shelter where thousands upon thousands of evacuees remained during Katrina. His experience includes being the FCO for the 2005 major flooding disaster in Nevada.

Clearly the public-perceived errors of FEMA were not due to cronyism or the inexperience of its principals. Those questioning Brown’s credentials for the directorship do not understand the management position and do not give enough credit to the people and positions immediately below the director. Anyone who has worked six months at an agency with a political appointee and with at least one hundred employees knows that the Number 2 and Number 3 person do more to run the agency than any other official. It is equally understood in public administration that the department manager does more leading and implementation than the agency head. The same principle holds true in disaster management. Yet, for some reason the news media, Democrats, and Republicans pounced on the FEMA director and went back and forth with petty politics.

Katrina victims deserved better than this. It really made no difference that some of the Guard were in Iraq, but the Democrats were visibly in the mode of damage control. If both states had 60% of its Guard, the Katrina fallout was caused more by a lack of leadership and lack of planning than a lack of resources. It really served no purpose, other than for journalists and Democrats, to bicker about cronyism in the beginnings of recovery from catastrophe. People cannot blame nature, but they can and do blame someone for not getting them ready for a disaster they knew for days was coming close to their area. To assess the blame accurately, though, the politics have to be sorted through meticulously. An independent hearing, much like the one held for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, would be useful to sort through the bad punditry.

Instead, the House Subcommittee Hearings on Katrina was organized, in part, to determine who had culpability for the public-perceived, slow FEMA response. It was expected to be bipartisan and, at first glance, it appeared to be. However, it was clear from statements of the Representatives during FEMA Director Brown’s testimony that the committee had already resolved who was to blame. It was FEMA. Representative Taylor gave FEMA an “F-minus” and Representative Granger told Brown she did not know how he could sleep at night because “he lost the battle.” At Chertoff’s hearing, Representative Shays referred to the FEMA employees as dunderheads. One must question why Brown was called to the committee if it had already determined that he was at fault. The question should be asked how objective can a committee be when it has already formed opinions and viewpoints similar to those portrayed in the national news media?

At Brown’s congressional hearing, Louisiana Democrat William Jefferson denied Brown’s claims that the state or local government were at fault. Jefferson also said that everyone had expected FEMA to take charge of preparations for Katrina and before Katrina hit. The embattled FEMA director stated how Governor Jeb Bush had southern Florida residents evacuated days before its last few hurricanes, but Jefferson ignored that and FEMA’s successful handling of previous hurricanes in Florida. If FEMA had gone into a type of martial law role, which it would have had to do with military in order to do what Jefferson wants, the state and local leaders would have opposed FEMA. Indeed, there was considerable local bluster and backlash when rumors surfaced that FEMA was going to commandeer gas stations.

One Congressman compared Brown to Mayor Giuliani and wished Giuliani had been the Katrina manager. This was really a measuring of Katrina to 9/11, and it is doubtful Mayor Giuliani would have had different results than Brown. Compared to 90,000 square miles that Katrina hit, the area impacted by terrorists in New York is swallowed in comparison. On 9/11 there was a much smaller area to search to conduct rescues, which were practically finished after the first day because there was no one left to rescue. Rescues for Katrina lasted well over a week. The manpower, equipment, and medical attention needed for 9/11 was far less than what was needed for Katrina. Also, it was much easier to get these supplies and equipment to the World Trade Center area by roads and ports that had not been completely destroyed like those in Katrina. Whereas resources had to be sent to the same city in the same state for 9/11, for Katrina they had to be stretched across four states and as far as 100 miles north of the Gulf Coast.

It was clear from the questioning of Brown and outright accusations of some committee members that FEMA and Brown were the only cause of the problems. One must ask why have the hearings at all when Representative Gene Taylor gave Brown an F-minus; Representative Cynthia McKinney wanted Brown fired; and another member wanted New York Mayor Guiliani in charge instead of Brown. If the committee predetermined culpability based on news reports, then how credible and responsible will its final report be?

Congress and the news media also tried to link management failures in Katrina to President Bush. Just as President Bush was criticized for not reacting quickly and decisively to 9/11, he was scoffed at for inaction to Katrina. In a possible dig at President Bush for his reorganization of the nation’s security, some House Subcommittee members focused their questions on whether FEMA should have been merged into the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA was brought into DHS in March 2003. The National Response Plan, which is the strategy pertaining to major disasters, had already been created and extensively revised under the Bush Administration a few years before because of 9/11. Before the Bush revisions, the plan was called the Federal Response Plan and was last printed as such in 1999. By examining both plans it is clear that, whether it was inside or outside DHS, FEMA would have followed the same plan when responding to Katrina.

Some Democrats, like Representatives Debbie Schultz, Tim Ryan, and Kendrick Meek, selectively publicized a handful of Brown’s comments sent in a few email during Katrina. Night after night on C-SPAN, these Representatives used Brown’s plight to harangue President Bush’s Administration. Of course, there were literally hundreds of pages of email sent by Brown and his press secretary in the immediacy of Katrina.[30] This type of petty politics will not make FEMA better and it will not improve the troubles of the victims.

Other news reports and statements of some Congressmen had Bush giving too much attention to terrorism instead of natural disasters. It cannot be denied that Bush’s presidency is chiefly about the War on Terrorism. Of the 1,200 major disasters FEMA has responded to, though, only 4 have been related to terrorism. Some would suspect that this was one reason why preparation for Katrina had gone poorly, but natural disasters did take precedence over terrorism before 9/11. In fact, the old Federal Response Plan if downloaded, is 858 kilobytes in size with terrorism constituting only 50 kilobytes of it. The new National Response Plan (NRP) does have more attention devoted to terrorism, and those opposing Bush’s War on Terrorism can use this difference for their own political purposes as they so choose. In regards to Katrina, however, it serves no useful purpose. Even with the new NRP, FEMA’s role and responsibility in natural disasters preparation has not changed.

For preparation, FEMA did do what is has always done. The supplies to be used in the response phase arrived eventually and when the victims were relocated to temporary housing, the media pressure eventually subsided. It took a while for the government at the federal and state level to understand how the public expected them to act in the crisis though. First, President Bush accepted full responsibility while assuring the public that it was going to be helped. Then Secretary Chertoff, after initially assigning responsibility to Director Brown, announced his blameworthiness along with changes he was going to make to ensure Katrina shortcomings are not repeated. Although she does not answer the question when asked what she did wrong, Governor Blanco briefly said she should take the blame for Katrina. Mayor Nagin remained aloof or turned away questions about responsibility and culpability.

I think a big part of this story that’s been missed is well over a million people evacuated New Orleans. There’s been alot of criticism of planning, and who did what and who didn’t do what. . . . Somebody made the call early enough to get over a million people out of that city which is a magnificent and significant achievement that seems to be totally overlooked. --Lt. General Steven Blum, September 3

---Governor Jeb Bush dealing with new complaints about FEMA’s response to Hurricane Wilma.

In all the discussions of assigning blame to numerous actors, none have addressed the culpability of the news media. It is very difficult to keep journalists happy. Few decisions in emergency management can be made without a negative viewpoint being presented. In regards to 9/11, the government was criticized for not issuing warnings about information it had that America was going to be attacked. So when it got information about possible terrorist attacks on the tunnel in Baltimore and the subway tunnel in New York, warnings were issued that inevitably caused considerable delays for the public. The government was heavily criticized in the news media for not acting on warnings that 9/11 was coming; when it acted on warnings about the tunnels and those warnings turned out to be unneeded, the government still got taken to task by the media. Some journalists even suggested that the tunnel scares were to help get the public focus back on President Bush’s War on Terrorism. Journalists could have easily portrayed these stories to make it appear as though the government was working to solve the problem instead of creating the problem, but they chose otherwise.

In times of great disaster, people and the news media do look to the national government for the problem solving. The problem in Katrina was that people had no homes and water and that lawlessness appeared to be aplenty. Only a handful of days after Katrina, the news media latched onto Michael Brown as its source of the problem. They did so without a full understanding of how FEMA worked and how homeland security was supposed to work at the state and local levels of government. In short order, the main focus for FEMA became not about helping people but about how soon was its director going to be replaced. The news media found its whipping boy. In doing so, the news media actually caused distractions rather than solutions. It was as though if the director were replaced, the rapidity of the problem-solving would increase. It did not matter that bringing aboard a new general would also bring greater learning curves.

After landfall and before two full weeks had even passed, the news media already helped get FEMA sued. The US Army, now under Michael Brown, issued a zero access policy for the news media in New Orleans. Terry Ebbert, the New Orleans Director of Homeland Security, supported the policy because he did not want the media showing dead bodies on television.[31] At the risk of creating conspiracy-theory thinking, it has to be noted that the zero access policy and lawsuit certainly was not cause for the news media to support Michael Brown. CNN had already sued FEMA and received a federal court date by September 11. One of the justifications that CNN used to request an injunction on the zero access policy was how poorly Brown had handled the Katrina response.

The Time Magazine article had been bandied about in the TV news so much that Brown’s opening statements at the House Subcommittee hearings included a rebuttal to it. Brown had overseen 150 disasters, including the four Florida hurricanes in 2004, so one must wonder how much experience he needed before he was considered qualified to manage Katrina? The great irony in the carping of Brown’s credentials is that the journalists themselves were unqualified to sit in judgment of an emergency management employee because of the background gap between emergency worker and journalist. Michael Brown and FEMA had become such a concentration for the news media that Representatives at the House Subcommittee hearings began with presuppositions and opinions of Brown. Michael Brown said that one mistake he made was talking directly to news reporters instead of issuing them written reports. Two weeks after Katrina made landfall, Brown was issuing written reports.[32]

Sometimes the news media do distort reality unnecessarily, but sometimes the distortion is not their fault. The New Orleans Police Chief Eddie Compass told Ted Koppel that SWAT teams were shot at 30 times when they approached the Superdome.[33] Blum said one reason he waited until Sept 2 to send 1,000 Guard to the Superdome was because of the news reports that New Orleans SWAT teams were at the Superdome.[34] There were gang members rampant at the Superdome and there were stabbings, but those news reports are now believed to be false. Still, at that time he did not want to create a hostage situation. It took time to brief and prepare the Guard for this new responsibility of evacuating the Superdome so it could be reoccupied safely with evacuees.[35]

In times of disaster, distortion can cause problems for the military, law enforcement, and recovery workers. Lieutenant General Steven Blum of the National Guard criticized the news media for focusing only on two blocks of New Orleans. Considering that Katrina touched 90,000 square miles, his claim appears to be true. With the Superdome being practically the only shelter above ground, that is where many reporters were based. Also, the Guard were dropping people off on the Huey P. Long bridge, a site where many reporters converged. These locations, not being under water, are where the reporters were so that is where all the news came from.

Blum disparaged the news media for portraying New Orleans as a anarchistic area.[36] Images of looters and false reports of police being shot at deterred civilian truckers from delivering much needed supplies. According to Blum, truck drivers actually stayed at truck stops until they had a greater belief that New Orleans was not as dysfunctional and unsafe as the news media made it out to be.[37]

Even after Hurricane Wilma, FOX News on Day 3 was doing stories about how slow and poor relief was for the newest victims in Florida.[38] One reporter was seen standing at a parking lot that had been made into a Red Cross distribution center for ice and water. While the reporter was talking about how Governor Bush was “taking responsibility for the slow relief,” car after car could be seen in the background getting ice and water put into their trunks and then driving off in a matter of only seconds! Further in the background were seen stacks of ice and pallets of water bottles. Clearly FEMA had a system in place and was working as quickly as possible to bring people aid. Yet this is not the atmosphere that was portrayed in the news story. Other reporters were reporting the “horrible delays” in line for gas, without even considering how important it was that gas was available at all.

When the Red Cross over estimated by hundreds of thousands the number of people still in hotels by September 19^th, FOX news still blamed FEMA for the discrepancy. When FEMA stopped the issuance to people of emergency two thousand dollar checks, it was lambasted in the news media by Louisiana government officials. Had the payments not been stopped, FEMA would have been making huge overpayments.[39] Indeed, by October, news reports were inevitably surfacing that FEMA overpaid victims 174 million dollars.[40] Other stories aired about supposed victims spending FEMA money on luxury items, such as stereos and televisions. Why was FEMA not being more careful with its money, the stories implied? Orthodox and calculated procedures, maligned as red tape, were discarded to increase distribution. The ironic circumstance is that eventually FEMA will have been found to make overpayments because of public and media pressure to speed up the process. FEMA will be taken to task for this after the public and media commiseration with Katrina victims dwindles to nearly none.

Several reporters who covered the Huey P. Long bridge in New Orleans carped the government for its “dumping people off and leaving them there” without any food and water.[41] The criticism came without giving any thought to the previous conditions those people had been in. Many came from rooftops and some had to be pulled from the flood waters. Had those victims on the Huey P. Long bridge been asked, they probably would have stated they were better off than they were a little while ago. Furthermore, the Huey P. Long bridge had not been a preplanned shelter or point of distribution. This was one of the few places above water, so a quick decision was made to bring rescued people there. People on the Huey P. Long bridge received food and water on Day 3. FEMA Public Affairs Officer Marty Bahamonde, who was in New Orleans when Katrina hit, stated in his US Senate testimony that ground “transportation into the city was virtually non-existent because of the massive flooding.” He added that transportation had to “come from west of the city because the I-10 bridge to Slidell on the east side of the city was completely destroyed and there was no access from the north because of flooded roads.” FEMA does logistical planning. FEMA does coordination. Implementation, however, takes alot more and involves alot more than the 2,400 full-time employees of FEMA. That food and water made it to the bridge in three days was a huge accomplishment.

In a disaster like Katrina there is no action the federal government can take that will not cause negative criticism. This is understandable when considering that one hour without electricity, food, and water seems like one full day. After landfall, it seemed as though most of the early news stories about FEMA either said directly or implied that the agency was slow in responding to victims. The stories made it sound as though FEMA was not helping and that it was causing problems rather than solving them. In such times, though, the public needs news that is reassuring instead of disturbing. Encouragement was there had journalists wanted to find it.

The news media and House Select Subcommittee have picked FEMA as their agent of blame, and in doing so, they are misleading the public. This is not to say that the news media do not sometimes have good effects. Representatives on the House Subcommittee on Katrina noted that the evacuation in southeast Texas and southwest Louisiana went much more smoothly and that residents were more serious for Hurricane Rita. It cannot be gainsaid that the news media coverage of Katrina had a significant effect in that response.

From our perspective, [federalizing the operation] would not have provided an advantage over our current situation.

The danger is if you rush in with too much too soon, then that becomes overwhelmed by the disaster. So we set up these sites outside of the anticipated landfall area, and then once we see where landfall occurs, then we begin to establish lower-level sites down to local distribution.

Under the old Federal Response Plan, the FEMA director selected the Federal Coordinating Officer who directly managed the disaster. Although Michael Brown was the director of FEMA and technically in charge of the agency, DHS Secretary Chertoff did not contact and make Brown the Principal Federal Officer (PFO) over Katrina until Tuesday after the hurricane hit. Chertoff was asked several times during a House hearing why Brown was appointed after Katrina landfall instead of before. His answers were vague and imprecise. It is still not clear why Brown was made PFO a day after, but it is clear that such designations should be made before landfall. Having effective leadership in place before the disaster is part of successful planning, and it would have made criticism of Brown more valid had the title appointment been made earlier by Chertoff.

During a disaster, Federal Coordinating Officers are brought in from other states. Although these people are experienced and good at their jobs, they probably have little working relationship with the relevant governor, mayor, and local emergency managers. It is safe to say that Florida Governor Jeb Bush has dealt with emergency management officials that he never would have worked with had there not been four hurricanes in 2004. Obviously he and the administrative officials immediately below him had a better working relationship with emergency management personnel than the Louisiana government did with its local personnel and FEMA. Having a first-name working relationship from the top down should not be taken lightly either. Although it can be assumed that Nagin, Blanco, local emergency management officials, and FEMA will work better with each other because of the Katrina experience, exercises in natural disaster response and preparation should be mandatory for any new mayor and governor. Officials should not be meeting each other for the first time in an Emergency Operations Center in the onset of a disaster.

FEMA Director Michael Brown stated at his congressional hearing that one of his mistakes was not realizing sooner that New Orleans was dysfunctional. He was castigated for saying that, but the media and Congress took his remarks the wrong way. “Dysfunctional” means impaired functioning, so local emergency management in New Orleans was dysfunctional. Had he realized it more quickly, Brown could have brought in the Department of Defense sooner to use its resources. This was most definitely a mistake on his part.

The State Coordinating Officer (SCO) is the official appointed by the governor to handle the disaster management at the state level and to be a liaison with FEMA. No reporting or public scrutiny of this official’s involvement in Louisiana has been provided. It should be, and the House Subcommittee should have requested testimony of this person immediately after it had Brown’s.

The greatest tragedy of all the partisan politics in the immediacy of Katrina is that practically no investigative reporting of New Orleans Mayor Nagin and Governor Blanco came forward. More than likely Nagin was being fed from below, but it was him telling the public that 10,000 people were expected dead. The actual number was less than 1,500. ABC was told by the New Orleans Police Chief Eddie Compass that police had been shot at 30 times when they tried to approach the Superdome shelter. That was a police reporting that could never be verified. Lt. General Steven Blum of the National Guard said in the first few days after landfall that the New Orleans Police Department only had 500 of its personnel available. Before Katrina, it had 1,500. Nagin’s police were mostly absent, suspected of looting, and under investigation. As important as communication is during a catastrophe, the mayor’s office did not have one charged satellite phone.[42] In short, the mayor was clearly surrounded by unreliable personnel, and his public statements under duress intimated his own shortcomings to be an effective crisis manager. The House Subcommittee and the news media ought to examine the state and local management more closely.

Regarding the state and local responsibility in Katrina, the old Federal Response Plan is enlightening. It shows that even before President Bush took office that the chief course of action during a natural disaster was to be implemented by state and local officials. The supreme question New Orleans residents should be asking is why there are federal hearings to determine culpability, in which FEMA is bearing the burden, but no such hearings are present in Louisiana. Governor Blanco should have an independent commission organized and structured much like the 9/11 Commission.

Talk is escalating about putting most of FEMA’s functions under the Department of Defense. There are misconceptions that the response went more smoothly and quickly once the Department of Defense stepped into Katrina. Of course, people are forming this view based on what they see in the news, which leaves speculation about what they are not seeing on the TV news. The misconception lies in two matters. First, the greatest part of the rescue process was over after a few days. Second, greater military and civilian support converged upon New Orleans from over 40 states by the end of the first week. There can be little argument that once the military gets involved, a clear chain of command and mission forms. However, the problem inherent in placing FEMA’s responsibilities under the DOD is that less emphasis will be given to local personnel being the first responders. What happens if at the same time there is a another hurricane like Katrina, an earthquake in California, another terrorist attack in New York, and a tsunami on the East Coast? What if there is a typhoon and an earthquake at the same time? It sounds improbable, but so did 9/11 at first. The Department of Defense has its Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan for each of these events, so it is definitely possible to have a simultaneous state disaster. This is also why states have signed emergency management compacts. Furthermore, terrorists undoubtedly have taken lessons from Katrina. What better time for them to strike than in a situation that has consumed much of the nation’s defense concentration? In a multi state calamity that guzzles rescue and recovery resources, DOD should be able to rely on properly trained personnel already in place at the local level.

Congress is considering the suggestion to let DOD take the initiative over core recovery responsibilities. Reorganizing agencies, thereby changing plans and procedures that have worked for years, should not be the natural response to every calamity. President Bush had just recently reorganized the government, which included moving FEMA, in response to a terrorist act. Now it is possible that FEMA is going to be reorganized once again. How is an agency expected to get better and adapt to its responsibilities when its responsibilities keep shifting? The Department of Defense could still be heavily involved in any disaster without specific legislation and without declaring martial law. For example, the DOD had 8 swift water rescue teams and 50 helicopters available just 2 days after Katrina landfall.[43]

There has been little national criticism about the state and local response to Hurricane Rita. In fact, the coordination in Rita is a model being compared to what happened in New Orleans. Obviously the main reason Rita caused fewer problems is that the overwhelming majority of the area residents evacuated. The governor of Texas and the mayor of Houston refused to let happen to them what happened to Blanco and Nagin. Coordination in Rita was better because state and local leaders gave more significance to preparation and response. According to Lt. General Steven Blum, the “civilian authority” got better, but “the military stayed the same.”[44] The argument that the public would be better served by the Coast Guard dispensing food and water can be played down by realizing that this is the type of work civilian volunteers can do easily. In America there is seldom a shortage of volunteers in a national crisis. It is true that truck drivers in the Guard would not hold out at truck stops due to fear. Yet, as the first days of rescue and recovery in Katrina demonstrated, the Guard units are needed in other areas for other missions in which civilians cannot be utilized.

Senator Lieberman has said that getting food and water to the Superdome one full day after Katrina was unacceptable. FEMA had emergency response teams in New Orleans on Day 2, but Senator Lieberman thinks this should have been faster than 24 hours. The agency endured colossal criticism for the deplorable conditions of the thousands of victims who were sent to the Superdome shelter. Curiously, FEMA had to provide extra food and water to accommodate new evacuees that were being told to go to the Superdome or who were brought to the Superdome after being rescued.[45] It appears on the face of it that FEMA should be lauded rather than denigrated at least for getting extra supplies there on Day 2. With New Orleans cut off from the North and East, having food and water in the city the next day was commendable.

Senator Lieberman also took issue with FEMA having only one of its officials in New Orleans before Katrina. The Senator wants FEMA to put search and rescue units in the target zone before the storm so that they will be ready to work immediately after landfall.[46] Of course, FEMA does not have search and rescue units because those belong to the state government and are utilized by the National Guard. His point is understood nevertheless, but his thinking on this matter is unwise. FEMA knows it is a bad idea to put resources in harm’s way. The result could be that the search and rescue units themselves would need rescuing. Indeed several New Orleans police officers were pulled off their roof tops after Katrina, although one could question why they were at home instead of on duty.[47] Through the mayor’s office, the Superdome was made the main evacuation shelter. FEMA did not make that decision.[48] Having law enforcement and perhaps one medical team at the main shelter before landfall is not an impractical plan altogether, but those resources should come from the local community and be completely operated under the city’s emergency management system. FEMA should not be called upon to put its personnel in the middle of a target zone beforehand because years of experience, and legislation for that matter, has produced a plan that has it directly responding after the disaster. It is improbable that a general would send troops into an area that he knew was soon going to get an airstrike. The Senate ought not whimsically rebuff a plan that took years to develop, and the Senate should at least question the line workers for FEMA before it makes such a decision. FEMA has only 2,400 employees. It would be better to let the agency decide how best to utilize its personnel.

Since the creation of FEMA, this federal agency has responded to 1,200 major disasters. This agency can and does respond annually to 50 standard disasters. Surely the more experience it gets, the better its performance will get also. With the onset of so many disasters, however, the chances will increase that mistakes will be made. When an agency makes its first significant error, it should be allowed to learn from its mistakes and build upon the lessons learned. Making a quick and uninformed decision to redesign an agency or reassign its responsibilities because one of its 1,200 disasters did not go according to plan sounds imprudent.

To the maximum extent possible, internal local and State resources should be used as the first line of support in response to a disaster. . . . Most disasters and emergencies are handled by local and State responders. . . . FEMA provides support for logistics management; communications and information technology; financial management; community relations, congressional affairs, public information, and other outreach; and information collection, analysis, and dissemination. . . . In a disaster or emergency, each State has primary responsibility for law enforcement, using State and local resources, including the National Guard to the extent that the National Guard remains under State authority and has not been called into Federal service or ordered to active duty. ---Federal Response Plan, 1999

Although the majority of this paper deals with preparation, some further comments need to be made about the response phase. The motives of the House Subcommittee are understandable in that it has to deal with the here and now. FEMA is largely responsible for the recovery phase of a major disaster. People were still living in hotels or other shelter-like facilities months after Katrina because FEMA-promised trailers had not become available and the clean-up process was not moving rapidly enough. So victims brought their frustration to their Representatives, who in turn took action against FEMA to give those victims some kind of recourse. Consequently, members of the House Subcommittee and the news media have chosen not to distinguish between preparation and response. Even in this article the two have become blurred at times due to inseparable politics. The pity in this is that focusing on the response, all the while scapegoating FEMA, is not necessarily the best measure to take when trying to prevent a similar Katrina experience in the future.

The federal government has been handling disasters successfully since the 1800s. Basically the same disaster plan, although modified when necessary, has been implemented consistently and effectively for decades in Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi. What made results different this time was the State that was involved. It is apparent that Louisiana was not prepared. It is very clear that the Louisiana government, rather than the federal government, should have been better prepared for a levee break in its on state. Had more time been spent on preparation, the response to Katrina would not have been hampered with so many problems.

In World War II, a court marshal of a single admiral was allowed for what happened at Pearl Harbor even though others in the federal government and military suspected that Japan was going to attack America somewhere. The admiral had not been given that warning. Just like the government picked one person for Pearl Harbor, it has done so with Michael Brown. The Louisiana state governor and New Orleans mayor had been given several recent warnings too. History had even given them Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Andrew as warnings. It is imperative that in assigning blame and responsibility for Katrina that the government and the news media get it right. Those affected by Katrina deserve it. They were let down by local leaders before; they should not be again.

From reading this article, one will assume it is a defense of Michael Brown and FEMA. An argument could also be made that not one iota of concern in this paper has been given to the residents of New Orleans. With countless images of black elderly and black poor sitting on the side of a road and surrounded by flooding water for days, obviously something was broken and few people could be disinterested in their plight. This author waited in line for water, ice, and gas just like everyone else in Southern Mississippi. Consequently, this article was written with nothing but solicitation for Katrina victims. If we are misled into thinking that one person and one agency is to blame and that only replacing a federal appointee will avert similar problems in the future, then our problems have not been solved and our security from hurricanes and flooding will not be secured.

Bahamonde, Marty. FEMA Public Affairs Officer. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. “Hearing to examine the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans,” U S Senate, SD-342. C-SPAN, October 20, 2005.

Blum, Steven. US National Guard Bureau Chief. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 3, 2005.

-----. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

Brown, Michael. Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency. House Subcommittee on Katrina. C-SPAN: September 27, 2005.

Bury, Chris. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October, 21, 2005.

Bush, George. US President. “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Mississippi” August 28, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828.html]: October 30, 2005.

----. “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana” August 27, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html]: October 30, 2005.

----. “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts” August 31, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050831-3.html]: October 30, 2005.

----. “President Discusses Hurricane Katrina, Congratulates Iraqis on Draft Constitution” August 28, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828-1.html]: October 30, 2005.

Chertoff, Michael. Secretary of Homeland Security Department. House Subcommittee on Katrina. C-SPAN: Ocotober 19, 2005.

CNN. “Convoys bring relief to New Orleans,” September 2, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/katrina.impact/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

CNN. “Evacuees wait as relief efforts build,” September 4, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/03/katrina.impact/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

CNN. “Admiral takes over Katrina relief,” September 9, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/09/katrina.washington/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

CNN. “Mayors fault FEMA response,” September 11, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/10/katrina.impact/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

CNN. “U.S. won’t ban media from New Orleans searches,” September 11, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/09/10/katrina.media/]: October 30, 2005.

Defilo, Marlon. Captain, New Orleans Police Department. MSNBC News, October 28, 2005.

FEMA. “FEMA Urges Patience While Search Continues for Stranded Victims and Supplies Stream In,” September 2, 2005. [http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18540]: October 22, 2005.

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. “Hearing to examine the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans,” U S Senate, SD-342, October 20, 2005.

Honoré, Russel. Lt. General, US Army. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 1, 2005.

Keating, Timothy. US Navy Admiral. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 5, 2005.

Lieberman, Joseph. US Senator. “Homeland Security Committee Holds Katrina Hearing, Receives Moving Testimony From FEMA Official Who Was In New Orleans During Storm,” C-SPAN, October 20, 2005.

McHale, Paul. Department of Defense Homeland Security Press Conference. August 31, 2005.

Oberman, Myra. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

Passey, David. FEMA official’s email sent on August 28. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. “Hearing to examine the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans,” U S Senate, SD-342. C-SPAN, October 20, 2005.

Pickering, Chip. Mississippi Congressman. “Pickering Questions Former FEMA Director At 2nd Katrina Committee Hearing” September 27, 2005 [http://www.house.gov/pickering/KatrinaHearing.htm]: October 30, 2005.

Strock, Carl. Army Corp of Engineers. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 2, 2005.

US House Committee on Government Reform, Select Subcommittee on Katrina, “Lessons Learned from Katrina,” C-SPAN, 10-19-05.

US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. C-SPAN, October 20, 2005.

XM Special Events. “Hurricane Wilma,” Emergency Alert Channel 247. Statement made to reporter on 10-21-05.

WWL. “Blanco goes to DC to answer Brown Charge,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=121784&spid=5478]: October 22, 2005.

WWL. “Farrakhan Blasts Federal Katrina Response,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=134644&spid=5478]: October 22, 2005.

WWL. “FEMA halts $2,000 critical-needs checks,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=122932&spid=5478]: October 22, 2005.

WWL. “FEMA overpaid at least $174 million to Katrina victims,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=136221&spid=]: October 22, 2005.

[1] WWL. “Blanco goes to DC to answer Brown Charge,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=121784&spid=5478]: October 22, 2005.

[2] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[3] Russel Honoré. Lt. General, US Army. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 1, 2005.

[4] CNN. “Mayors fault FEMA response,” September 11, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/10/katrina.impact/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

[5] George Bush. “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts” August 31, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050831-3.html]: October 30, 2005.

[6] FEMA. “FEMA Urges Patience While Search Continues for Stranded Victims and Supplies Stream In,” September 2, 2005. [http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18540]: October 22, 2005.

[7] US House Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Katrina. “Lessons Learned from Katrina,” C-SPAN, 10-19-05.

[8] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[9] US House Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on Katrina. “Lessons Learned from Katrina,” C-SPAN, 10-19-05.

[10] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[11] XM Special Events. “Hurricane Wilma,” Emergency Alert Channel 247. Statement made to reporter on 10-21-05.

[12] FOX News. “Hurricane Alert,” October 22, 2005.

[13] FOX News. “Hurricane Alert,” October 22, 2005.

[14] John King. “Staying Put,” CNN. October 23, 2005.

[15] Michael Chertoff. Secretary of Homeland Security Department. House Subcommittee on Katrina. C-SPAN: Ocotober 19, 2005.

[16] CNN. “Convoys bring relief to New Orleans,” September 2, 2005. [http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/katrina.impact/index.html]: October 22, 2005.)

[17] CNN. “Evacuees wait as relief efforts build,” September 4, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/03/katrina.impact/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

[18] WWL. “Farrakhan Blasts Federal Katrina Response,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=134644&spid=5478]: October 22, 2005.

[19] CNN. “Admiral takes over Katrina relief,” September 9, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/09/katrina.washington/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

[20] Philip Dine. St. Louis Post Dispatch [http://www.stltoday.com/]: September 3, 2005; Paul McHale, Department of Defense Homeland Security Press Conference. August 31, 2005.

[21] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[22] Lt. General Steven Blum. Department of Defense Homeland Security Press Conference. August 31, 2005.

[23] Russel Honoré. Lt. General, US Army. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 1, 2005.

[24] Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. Department of Defense News Briefing. September 3, 2005.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Michael Brown. Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency. House Subcommittee on Katrina. C-SPAN: September 27, 2005.

[27] George Bush. US President. “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Mississippi” August 28, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828.html]: October 30, 2005.

[28] Chip Pickering. Mississippi Congressman. “Pickering Questions Former FEMA Director At 2nd Katrina Committee Hearing” September 27, 2005 [http://www.house.gov/pickering/KatrinaHearing.htm]: October 30, 2005.

[29] George Bush. US President. “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana” August 27, 2005 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html]: October 30, 2005.

[30] Michael Brown. Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency. House Subcommittee on Katrina. C-SPAN: September 27, 2005.

[31] CNN. “U.S. won’t ban media from New Orleans searches,” September 11, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/09/10/katrina.media/]: October 30, 2005.

[32] CNN. “Admiral takes over Katrina relief,” September 9, 2005 [http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/09/katrina.washington/index.html]: October 22, 2005.

[33] Chris Bury. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October, 21, 2005.

[34] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] FOX News. “Hurricane Alert,” October 23, 2005.

[39] WWL. “FEMA halts $2,000 critical-needs checks,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=122932&spid=5478]: October 22, 2005.

[40] WWL. “FEMA overpaid at least $174 million to Katrina victims,” [http://www.wwl.com/Article.asp?id=136221&spid=]: October 22, 2005.

[41] Oberman, Myra. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October, 21, 2005.

[42] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[43] Paul McHale. Department of Defense Homeland Security Press Conference. August 31, 2005.

[44] Lt. General Steven Blum. US National Guard Bureau Chief. “Conference on Role of Military Reporters,” C-SPAN: October 21, 2005.

[45] Marty Bahamonde. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. “Hearing to examine the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans,” U S Senate, SD-342, October 20, 2005.

[46] Joseph Lieberman. US Senate. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. “Hearing to examine the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans,” U S Senate, SD-342, October 20, 2005.

[47] Marlon Defilo. Captain, New Orleans Police Department. MSNBC News, October 28, 2005.

[48] US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. C-SPAN, October 20, 2005.