Robert Shogan. Bad News : Where the press goes wrong in the making of the president. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001. 308 pp. $26.00. ISBN 1-56663-346-X.

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            Robert Shogan’s Bad News is one of the many books that will spring from the political reporting of the 2000 presidential election.  Despite the picture of George W. Bush and the description of the election in the cover, however, Bad News is much more than a narrative about the electoral controversy.  Indeed, the election is discussed in only the last chapter.  Shogan is more concerned about the interactions between politicians and journalists.
            The consequences of the now infamous election left many people pointing fingers at each other, but Shogan makes it clear in his preface that politicians and journalists have blamed each other for electoral shortcomings since the very first election. However, early in his work it becomes clear that Shogan is more solicitous of the changing character of the media.  He states that journalists “at one time or another have been guilty of just about every one of the seven deadly sins” when covering campaigns (p. 7).  The current trend of journalists exaggerating the smallest details is problematic, but journalists have been exploring the personal foibles of politicians long before now. 
            Alexander Hamilton’s sexual affair was reported widely by a man who later turned on Thomas Jefferson.  Hamilton disseminated a story that Jefferson had fathered a slave’s children.  Before he won the presidency, Jefferson had famously said that if he had a choice he would rather have newspapers than a government.  It did not take a long tour in public office for Jefferson to request “that newspapers be organized into four sections—truth, probabilities, possibilities, and lies. . .” (p. 112).  Jefferson had refused a federal job to the political gadfly who attacked him.  Andrew Jackson, on the other hand, appointed sixty journalists to governmental positions.  He made no secrets that the appointments were to offset a press that had grown so vicious. 
            The Government Printing Office being established in the late 1800s and having cheaper papers allowed much of the press to survive without being loyal to incumbents.  By the time Teddy Roosevelt was president, the press had so much influence that TR would not allow pictures of him playing tennis.  He enjoyed the sport, but he did not want to appear unmanly in the eye of the public.  In 1968, with Lyndon Johnson’s manipulation of the media concerning Vietnam, Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King’s assassination, and the Civil Rights movement, it was evident that the media were the “dominant messenger for political information” (p. 34).  Richard Nixon was aware of media power such that he gave greater concentration to commercials, because he feared the consequences of impromptu speech that appeared later in print.  George Wallace was certain that journalists wanted bad news, so he gave them plenty of it.  For Shogan, then, the late ’60s was an era that set journalists on the path of sensationalism.
            By 1972, journalists had grown so comfortable with what sells that they overlooked the causes of George McGovern’s unexpected nomination.  Party rules had changed, which were favorable for McGovern.  However, journalists thought the rules were below the interest of the public and perhaps too difficult for it to understand.  The result was that influence of party leaders in selecting candidates dwindled, and picking the winner in advance became more difficult for journalists.
            In the debates of the mid-70s between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, their political gaffes were given more attention in the media instead of issues that both were neglecting.  Shogan claims quite simply that it was easier to report mishaps of the tongue.  Both candidates assailed journalists for their lack of focus.  Journalists retorted that the candidates spent most of the day criticizing one another, so they had no right to complain when health issues were not covered.  Politicians do seem to attack each other often.  George Bush epitomized personal-attack tactics in his campaign against Michael Dukakis, and George W. did likewise to John McCain.  Carter and Ford were no different in the ’70s. 
            By the late ’70s, journalists had turned into full piranha and Edward Kennedy could not stand long in the water of a presidential campaign.  Conversely, Independent candidate John Anderson owes his diminutive success completely to the media.  Journalists gave him attention only because he was so different.
            Walter Mondale’s campaign in the early ’80s was too boring for journalists, especially when compared with playboy Gary Hart and the symbolism of Jesse Jackson.  Jackson was given special treatment in the media despite “the weaknesses of his political organization and the frequent inconsistencies and downright errors in his public statements. . .” (p. 123).  No one wanted to appear racist.  African Americans were given a disservice and a “distorted picture of the role of race in American politics” (p. 124).
            A second term in office allowed Ronald Reagan to become very adept at stage-managing the media.  Reporters were not allowed to cover the Grenada invasion because they would harm Reagan’s mission.  Only journalists cried about the press ban.  The public did not listen to the them, despite repeated claims they were trying to keep the public informed.
            Sexual mores relaxed considerably after the 1960s.  Journalists subsequently lessened their restraint in researching the sexual probity of presidential candidates.  Gary Hart was the first to fall victim.  Shogan implies that because Vietnam and Watergate have been linked to character deficiencies of presidents, it is acceptable for journalists to investigate the bedroom (pp. 134-135).  Trying to link sex to Vietnam and Watergate in this manner will be a hard sale to political scientists.  Many political scientists will say nevertheless that character is vitally important when the presidency is at stake.  In the end, Hart’s attempt to separate public values and personal values was unsuccessful.
            By the mid-90s, sleaze had become so concentrated in some of the media that journalists were suffering political myopia.  They touted the triumphant midterm elections of Republicans as an end of liberal reign.  No exit polls or other evidence were accurately sought to back the claim.  Had journalists scrutinized a little more, they would have found that most voters were unaware of the Republican Contract With America.  Also, many voters were dissatisfied with Bill Clinton’s not improving life for middle-class and working-class families.
            Journalists were also less than prudent with their reporting of the debates between George W. and Al Gore.  They declared Gore loss the first debate because of his sighs and grimaces at Bush’s responses.  However, the networks disparately focused on Gore when Bush was speaking, so not all viewers got the same picture.  Rules set by the Presidential Debate Commission supposedly kept reporters from covering Gore’s reactions while Bush was speaking, yet the next day CNN made a great issue of Gore’s off-camera demeanor with clear footage.  Polls stated that voters thought Gore won the debate, but many journalists were convinced otherwise.  Journalists were even less punctilious elsewhere.  Regarding the Bush-Gore election fiasco, journalists and news reporters rushed to gain “short-term recognition without reckoning the cost to their profession and the public” (p. 243).  Furthermore, the television networks should have reported “what they knew, not what they expected to happen . . . that the election was still too close to call” (p. 265).
            Shogan does something better than merely explain where the press generally goes wrong in presidential coverage; he describes some of the media problems of contemporary presidential elections and tells journalists what they should have done differently.  Journalists undoubtedly will be offended by one of their own telling them what to do but not always telling them how.  In one of the few exceptions, Shogan says journalists do not have to be directed by public opinion.  When polls showed that the public did not want journalists to question George W. any longer about possible cocaine use, he was still frequently asked.  The error here is that it should have been explained in the media why the question was important. 
            Despite Shogan’s similar remedies offered throughout his book, politicians and journalists will still point their fingers at each other.  This 250-year tradition makes it easy for Shogan to blame both politician and journalist for the current travails of political news coverage.  The politicians “practice their deceptions and distortions” and journalists oblige them (p. 243).  In depicting this relationship, Shogan appears curiously unbiased.
            A disinterested journalist as author makes Bad News a valuable read.  The reader can look past the discrepancy that Thomas Dewey was elected president in 1968, as is written on page 54.  Shogan’s examination should be considered a contribution to the study of the relationship between media and politics.  The bits of history intertwined throughout the book hold the reader’s attention and the author should be commended for this.  Thanks should be given for the scarcity of Monica Lewinsky in the book.  Apparently, Shogan feels there has been enough coverage of Monicagate.  Readers should be warned that the author’s subtitle is a misnomer.  Robert Shogan, in Bad News, shows how the media unmake most of the men who seek to become president.  Only with that method, do other people indirectly reach the White House.